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NOTE
THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS'
ENFORCEMENT OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
IN SOLIS V. MATHESON: A DISCUSSION OF LAWS OF
GENERAL APPLICABILITY AND THEIR IMPACT ON
TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE
Doug Nix*
I. Introduction
With tens of thousands of new congressional regulations becoming effective
every year and hundreds of thousands already in effect, to say that the impact
on anyone or any group falling subject to these regulations is immense is an
understatement. So when a statute makes broad categorizations about when it
regulates by stating, for example, that it applies to employers with employees
engaged in interstate commerce, whom exactly does it mean to include?' This
statute, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and many others like it, never refers to
Indian tribes, either because Congress never considered the possibility of the
statute applying to tribes because they did not intend for it to apply to them, or
perhaps because they simply assumed it would apply. In cases that raise the
issue of whether these types of statutes were intended to apply to Indian tribes,
the only thing that is clear is that the statutes are not.
These are telling conditions for the atmosphere surrounding the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals when it heard Solis v. Matheson, a case that adds to what has
been an ongoing battle between the longstanding principle that ambiguous
federal statutes are to be resolved in favor of Indian tribes (therefore requiring
specific congressional intent in order to apply the statute to them) and the belief
that federal statutes should be presumed to apply to Indian tribes.2 The court
* Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2006).
2. 563 F.3d 425 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 766
(1985) ("[S]tatutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous
provisions interpreted to their benefit."); Fed. Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362
U.S. 99, 116 (1960) ("[I]t is now well settled by many decisions of this Court that a general
statute in terms applying to all persons includes Indians and their property interests."); Elk v.
Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 100 (1884) ("General acts of congress [do] not apply to Indians, unless
359
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in Matheson held that the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), a federal statute
silent on whether it pertains to Indian tribes or their members, applied to a
business located on an Indian reservation and owned by tribal members.3 The
importance of a court holding as the Ninth Circuit did in this case is because of
the reasons implied above: that the enormous amount of statutes that were once
unclear as to their application to tribes may now be presumed to apply to them.
This creates a new reality for many Indian tribes: that in order to overturn this
presumption, they now must engage in costly litigation or else risk being
massively regulated by the federal government and thereby lose both tribal
sovereignty and independence.
This note examines the Ninth Circuit's troubling interpretation of prior case
law in Solis v. Matheson and argues that the cases on which it relies were
misused and their holdings stretched much further than was ever intended. The
note then addresses the relevant canons of statutory construction and discusses
how their neglect, along with the misinterpretation of applicable cases, led to the
creation of the exceptions used in Matheson. The discussion continues by
describing the ramifications that this type of analysis will have on tribal
sovereignty and independence and further suggests alternatives to the Ninth
Circuit's interpretation that more accurately reflect standing case law. This note
concludes by tying together the reasons why the Supreme Court should grant
certiorari in this case (or one like it) to clear up this muddied issue and prevent
the possibility of this holding extending further to the point where this
presumption continues to apply even in the presence of conflicting tribal laws.
I. The Application of FLSA to the Mathesons
Solis v. Matheson involves a smoke shop owned by Paul and Nick Matheson,
members of the Puyallup Indian Tribe.' The shop is located on trust land within
the Puyallup Reservation, but sells products both to Indians and non-Indians.
The case arose when the U.S. Secretary of Labor filed suit against the
Mathesons for failure to pay overtime wages to their employees, as required by
FLSA.' The Mathesons countered that FLSA should not apply to them because
they are eligible either for the intramural-affairs exception, the treaty-rights
exception, or both.,
so expressed as to clearly manifest an intention to include them.").




7. Id. at 429.
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FLSA applies to enterprises that have employees and engage in interstate
commerce.' The statute's objective is "to achieve certain minimum labor
standards, such as overtime [wage] requirements."9 The court in Matheson
began its analysis by stating that FLSA did not expressly apply to tribes and, as
such, was a statute of general applicability.o It then continued under the
presumption that statutes of general applicability apply to tribes and their
members unless one of a few narrowly construed exceptions is implicated."
From there the court addressed the intramural exception. Because the smoke
shop was owned only by tribal members and not the tribe itself, the court found
there was nothing "profoundly intramural" about the Mathesons' business,
therefore ruling that the exception did not apply.12 Next, the court held that,
because there was neither a direct discussion of employment or wages in the
treaty nor any language ambiguous enough to be construed as covering required
payment of wages, the application of FLSA to a retail business did not impact
the tribe's treaty with the United States. 3 Not finding any of the exceptions
applicable, the court additionally concluded that the Secretary of Labor was
authorized to enter the reservation for the purpose of locating records necessary
to enforce the statute despite treaty language giving the Puyallup Tribe the right
to exclude and prevent non-Indians from residing on their land. ' The court did,
however, vacate the automatic appointment of a receiver upon the Mathesons'
failure to pay because evidence had neither been presented nor findings made
to show why such appointment was necessary.'
II. Legal History
A. How the Issue Arose
The issue of whether statutes of general applicability apply to Indian tribes
first arose in Elk v. Wilkins, in which the United States Supreme Court found
that, "Under the constitution of the United States, as originally established, . . . .
[g]eneral acts of congress [do] not apply to Indians, unless so expressed as
to clearly manifest an intention to include them." 6 Confusion then began to
8. 29 U.S.C. § 202 (2006).
9. Matheson, 563 F.3d at 429; see also 29 U.S.C. § 207(a).
10. Matheson, 563 F.3d at 429.
11. Id. at 429-30.
12. Id. at 434.
13. Id. at 435.
14. Id. at 437.
15. Id. at 438.
16. 112 U.S. 94, 99-100 (1884).
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arise after the Supreme Court's holding in Federal Power Commission v.
Tuscarora Indian Nation.17 Tuscarora addressed whether a section of tribal
lands may be condemned by a licensee under the eminent-domain powers
granted by the Federal Power Act." The Court found that the Act clearly
indicated that Congress intended to include tribal lands under the statute.' 9 But
given Congress's authority to limit, modify, or even eliminate sovereign powers
that the tribes otherwise retain,20 once the Court acknowledged Congress's
intent to apply the statute to the Indian tribes, its analysis needed to go no
further. As a result, the Court's now oft-quoted statement that "it is now well
settled by many decisions of this Court that a general statute in terms applying
to all persons includes Indians and their property interests"21 is arguably dicta.
Tuscarora relied on two cases in particular, Superintendent ofFive Civilized
Tribes ex rel. Fox v. Commissioner22 and Oklahoma Tax Commission v.
United States,23 where the Court found that statutes broadly included Indian
tribes because Congress had not made any indication to the contrary.24 The first
found that the statute at issue was so broad as to express Congress's intent to
tax every citizen. 25 The second relied on the rule against finding implied
exemptions in tax statutes to conclude that the Indian-owned properties at issue
were intended to be subject to the tax." The language in Tuscarora has led
several circuit courts to find that a presumption exists that statutes of general
applicability apply to tribes and their members.27
17. 362 U.S. 99 (1960).
18. Id. at 115.
19. Id. at 118.
20. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978).
21. Tuscarora, 362 U.S. at 116.
22. 295 U.S. 418 (1935).
23. 319 U.S. 598 (1943).
24. Tuscarora, 362 U.S. at 116-17.
25. Fox, 295 U.S. at 419-20.
26. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 319 U.S. at 604.
27. See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Karuk Tribe Hous. Auth., 260
F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2001); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Fond du Lac
Heavy Equip. & Constr. Co., 986 F.2d 246, 250-51 (8th Cir. 1993); Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene
Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1115-16 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 893
(9th Cir. 1980), superseded by statute on other grounds, Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2497, as recognized in United States v. E.C. Invs., Inc.,
77 F.3d 327, 330 (9th Cir. 1996).
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Eighteen years later, the Supreme Court once more addressed the issue of
tribal sovereignty in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez.28 The holding in
Martinez-that an "unequivocal expression" of congressional intent is required
before courts can find that a tribe's sovereign immunity has been
abrogated 29-appears to be inconsistent with Tuscarora and is instead much
more aligned with the principles oftribal sovereignty and autonomy. Moreover,
the Court in Montana v. United States, consistent with its willingness to support
tribal independence, delineated the inherent sovereign power Indian tribes
retained over non-tribal members who enter into consensual commercial
relationships with them on or off Indian fee lands."o
Additional Supreme Court cases in the 1980s increased doubt that the
language in Tuscarora was anything more than overgeneralized dicta and that
statutes ambiguous as to their application should be interpreted to benefit tribes
so as to be consistent with traditional notions of sovereignty and tribal
independence.3 1 Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe3 2 was such a case. In
upholding the tribe's authority to tax non-members conducting business on
reservation lands, the Court held that Indian tribes are "invested with the right
of self-government and jurisdiction over the persons and property within the
limits ofthe territory they occupy,"" and their "authority to tax non-Indians who
conduct business on the reservation does not simply derive from the Tribe's
power to exclude such persons, but is an inherent power."34
B. The Circuit Courts
Reeling from this ambiguity, circuit courts have understandably been split
as to how these general statutes apply to tribes and their members." In
28. 436 U.S. 49 (1979).
29. Id. at 59.
30. 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981).
31. See, e.g., Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985) ("[S]tatutes are to be
construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their
benefit."); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 152 (1982) ("[A]mbiguities in
federal law have been construed generously in order to comport with ... traditional notions of
sovereignty and with the federal policy of encouraging tribal independence."') (quoting White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143-44 (1980)).
32. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
33. Id. at 140 (quoting S. REP. No. 45-698, at 1-2 (1879)).
34. Id. at 141.
35. See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Karuk Tribe Hous. Auth., 260
F.3d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that in the absence of express statutory language the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act did not apply because the relationship between the
tribal housing authority and a tribal member it employed touched on "purely internal matters");
No. 2]1 NOTE 363
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Donovan v. Navajo Forest Products Industries the Tenth Circuit refused to
apply the Occupational Safety and Health Act to a tribal business absent
congressional intent, as application would abrogate treaty provisions and dilute
principles of tribal sovereignty and self-government "merely on the predicate
that federal statutes of general application apply to Indians just as they do to all
other persons."36 In light of Merrion, the court held it would not divest tribal
power to manage reservation lands without some expression of legislative intent
to do so." But then the Ninth Circuit in Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal
Farm re-energized Tuscarora, giving its language new life by interpreting its
wording as a general rule that presumes the applicability of federal statutes to
tribes and their members unless one of three exceptions is met."
The court in Coeur d'Alene stated that
[a] federal statute of general applicability that is silent on the issue
of applicability to Indian tribes will not apply to them if: (1) the law
touches "exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural
matters"; (2) the application of the law to the tribe would "abrogate
rights guaranteed by Indian treaties"; or (3) there is proof "by
legislative history or some other means that Congress intended [the
law] not to apply to Indians on their reservations.39
Taking their lead from Coeur d'Alene, many circuits now presume the
applicability of ambiguous federal statutes and apply the three exceptions
solidified in that case.'
Reich v. Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d 174, 181-82 (2d Cir. 1996) (presuming the
applicability of OSHA in holding it applied to a tribal enterprise and would not interfere with
the tribe's self-governance in purely intramural affairs despite the fact that the tribal enterprise
was owned and operated by the tribe within the boundaries of the reservation); Equal
Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Cherokee Nation, 871 F.2d 937,938 n.3 (10th Cir. 1989)
(questioning "the continuing vitality of the Tuscarora decision in light of' Merrion); Donovan
v. Navajo Forest Prods. Indus., 692 F.2d 709, 713 (10th Cir. 1982) ("Merrion, in our view,
limits or, by implication, overrules Tuscarora .... .").
36. Navajo Forest Prods. Indus., 692 F.2d at 714.
37. Id.
38. 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985).
39. Id. (quoting United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 893-94 (9th Cir. 1980), superseded
by statute on other grounds, Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102
Stat. 2497, as recognized in United States v. E.C. Invs., Inc., 77 F.3d 327, 330 (9th Cir. 1996)).
40. See, e.g., Snyder v. Navajo Nation, 382 F.3d 892, 895 (9th Cir. 2004); Karuk Tribe
Hous. Auth., 260 F.3d at 1078-79; Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d at 181-82.
364 [Vol. 34
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol34/iss2/5
The Supreme Court then came back onto the scene with United States v.
Dion, holding that when a conflict exists between the law and Indian treaty
rights, a court may uphold the enforcement of a law against Indian tribes only
when Congress "actually considered the conflict" and expressly chose to
abrogate such rights." This creates the interesting argument ofwhether this was
simply meant to approve of a treaty-rights exception or whether the Court's
statement, if read in the context of the entire opinion, was an indirect espousal
of Congress's inability to regulate tribes and their members without expressing
an intent to do so.
C. Where Do These Decisions Leave Us?
The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the applicability of FLSA to Indian
tribes, and so far the issue has come before only two circuits."2 The Seventh
Circuit in Reich v. Great Lakes Fish & Wildhife Commission was the first to hear
the issue, but the court opted not to confront the principal issue by instead
finding FLSA inapplicable based on an exemption in the statute for law-
enforcement officials."3 In passing, the court pointed out that FLSA presumably
applied, but with no mention of Tuscarora.'
The first case addressing FLSA to reach the Ninth Circuit, Snyder v. Navajo
Nation, involved similar facts and concluded with a similar holding; however,
it explicitly presumed applicability pursuant to Tuscarora.45 The court then
tried to tie the exemption into one of the Coeur d'Alene exceptions, stating that
"[t]ribal law enforcement clearly is a part of tribal government and is for that
reason an appropriate activity to exempt as intramural."' Because the statute
expressly exempted the employees involved, 7 the language seemed
unnecessary. But it appears the court was willing to construe the facts to show
its willingness to apply Tuscarora and the Coeur d'Alene exceptions to FLSA
and other statutes of general applicability. With differing opinions having arisen
in the circuit courts, it appears time for the Supreme Court to take action by
validating one approach or formulating one of its own.
41. 476 U.S. 734, 740 (1986).
42. Solis v. Matheson, 563 F.3d 425 (9th Cir. 2009); Snyder, 382 F.3d at 895; Reich v.
Great Lakes Indian Fish & Wildlife Comm'n, 4 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1993).
43. Great Lakes Indian Fish & Wildlfe Comm'n, 4 F.3d at 495.
44. Id.
45. Snyder, 382 F.3d at 895.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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IV The Presumption for Statutes of General Applicability
A. Introduction to the Ninth Circuit's Analysis
Solis v. Matheson had the perfect set of facts that Snyder lacked. Unlike the
plaintiffs in Snyder, the Mathesons did not fall into any clearly defined
exception in the Fair Labor Standards Act.4 8 Without an express exception in
the Act, the court had to address whether FLSA, a statute of general
applicability, presumptively applied to Indian tribes. The case therefore created
an opportunity for the Ninth Circuit to solidify its application of Tuscarora and
Coeur d'Alene to FLSA.
The Ninth Circuit's reliance in Matheson on Tuscarora (and consequently
on Coeur d'Alene) to apply FLSA, a statute of general applicability, to a
business owned by tribal members is misplaced. The Supreme Court's
longstanding efforts to encourage tribal independence and construe ambiguous
statutes to tribes' benefit, if nothing else, mandates broader exceptions
consistent with these objectives to rebut the tenuous presumption of
applicability absent congressional intent.49
The fundamental issue in Matheson centers around whether statutes of
general applicability presumptively apply to businesses owned by tribal
members and located on tribal lands or whether general acts of Congress do not
apply to Indian tribes or their members unless at least some degree of evidence
suggests Congress intended to do so. This issue arises from dicta in Tuscarora,
where the Court stated that, despite the fact that general acts of Congress
originally did not apply to Indians under the United States Constitution absent
a clear intention to include them, "it is now well settled by many decisions of
this Court that a general statute in terms applying to all persons includes
Indians and their property interests."so If read to mean that a presumption now
exists that statutes of general applicability apply to Indian tribes and their
property, the language is clearly dicta because the Court found that Congress
intended to include Indians in the statute at issue. On the other hand, despite the
fact this language is seemingly straightforward, it is possible that the Court
simply overstated an idea that would otherwise comport with more traditional
themes in Indian law: that the Court was no longer going to require express
congressional intent to apply the statute to Indian tribes, but would now
48. See Solis v. Matheson, 563 F.3d 425, 429 (9th Cir. 2009).
49. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 740 (1986); Montana v. United States, 450
U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 152 (1978); Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59 (1978); Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 100 (1884).
50. Fed. Power Conun'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 116 (1960).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol34/iss2/5
consider the implied intention of Congress as well. If limited to this, the holding
would coincide much more with general principles of statutory construction as
well as with previous and subsequent case law."
B. Principles ofStatutory Construction
The dissection ofthis issue must begin with the significant canon of statutory
construction, consistently upheld by the Supreme Court, that federal statutes be
read generously in favor of Indian tribes and their members and that ambiguous
provisions be interpreted to their benefit." This has been further expanded to
support the general objective of aligning a statute with traditional notions of
sovereignty and tribal independence." These principles prove essential when
a court addresses whether a federal statute applies to a business owned by tribal
members because, under these guidelines, a federal statute ambiguous as to its
application should be analyzed in the light most favorable to the tribe. The
canons also comport with the Supreme Court's original assertion that, absent
a clear expression to the contrary, federal statutes do not apply to Indians.'
Solis v. Matheson exemplifies a situation where these canons of statutory
construction should apply.
The Fair Labor Standards Act, the statute the Secretary of Labor sought to
enforce, applies to enterprises with employees who engage in interstate
commerce." It also delineates a long list of other groups that are included. The
minimum-wage section of the Act even distinguishes between employees
employed in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, seamen on an American vessel,
and employees who are employed in agriculture," but neither it nor any other
section of the Act expresses any intention to apply its provisions to Indians,
tribes, or tribal employees. In fact, it fails to mention them at all. For that
reason its application to tribes is ambiguous and thus should be construed
liberally in their favor.
51. See Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985); Merrion, 455 U.S. at 152;
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143-44 (1980); Elk, 112 U.S. at 100.
52. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. at 766 ("[S]tatutes are to be construed liberally in favor of
the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit."); Merrion, 455 U.S. at 152
("'[A]mbiguities in federal law have been construed generously in order to comport with ...
traditional notions of sovereignty and with the federal policy of encouraging tribal
independence."' (quoting Bracker, 448 U.S. at 143-44)).
53. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 143-44.
54. Elk, 112 U.S. at 100.
55. 29 U.S.C. § 203 (2006).
56. Id. § 206(a).
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Read in a light favorable to the Mathesons' business, the statute should not
apply. First, and most obviously, it is a detriment to their business. The court's
holding requires the Mathesons to comply with FLSA, a statute that heightens
certain labor standards, such as overtime requirements," that they must follow.
This will present a major extra expense added to the cost of the Mathesons'
business and is therefore clearly not at all favorable to them. The holding also
requires them to pay $31,339.27 in overtime wages, which if they fail to pay
allows a receiver to be appointed who could have the authority to enter onto the
reservation and collect their assets."
Second, applying the Act to the Mathesons' business impinges on the
Puyallup Tribe's sovereignty and independence by taking away its power to
regulate or not regulate businesses owned by tribal members. Even though this
statute and many others like it could be said to provide a benefit to the
population as a whole, such as in this case ensuring minimum labor standards
for workers, the canons of construction nevertheless dictate that the statute
should be read in favor of tribal sovereignty and tribal independence. Under
this interpretation an ambiguous congressional act that is unfavorable to Indian
tribes or their members should always be construed in support of not applying
to Indian tribes.
C. The Ninth Circuit in Matheson
The Ninth Circuit begins its analysis by acknowledging that an Indian tribe
has "a strong interest as a sovereign in regulating economic activity involving
its own members within its own territory and. .. may enact laws governing such
activity."" Paradoxically though, the court follows this admission with a finding
that, because the Mathesons did not assert that the Puyallup Tribe enacted
different wage and hour laws that would have in effect been preempted by
FLSA, there was no evidence that the "Puyallup Tribe . .. acted on its right of
self-governance in [that] field."o But how does a finding that Indian tribes have
a strong interest in regulating economic activities of their members create an
assumption that the absence of tribal laws negates the significance of their
ability to self-govern? And while the court does not go so far as to say that any
57. Id. § 207(a)(2).
58. Solis v. Matheson, 563 F.3d 425, 438 (9th Cir. 2009).
59. Id. at 433-34 (quoting Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186,
1200 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1978)).




tribal laws that contradict FLSA would be preempted, it certainly does not say
that it would not."
With or without tribal laws, this language should be an important part of a
court's consideration because it also goes back to the canons of construction.
Even without tribal laws to the contrary, federal acts should still be read
favoring the tribe's interest in regulating the economic activity of its members.
This is additionally supported by the precept espoused in Montana v. United
States that
Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms
of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on
non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may regulate, through taxation,
licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter
consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through
commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. A
tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over
the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when
that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the
tribe.62
The court in Matheson argues that there is neither evidence that the tribe
asserted regulatory authority over employment and wages for non-Indians nor
evidence that "non-Indians employed at [the Mathesons' smoke shop] entered
into any agreements or dealings with the Puyallup Tribe that would subject
[them] to tribal civil jurisdiction.""
First, if the tribe retains the inherent sovereign authority to regulate the
activities of non-members who enter into commercial relationships with it or its
members, should the lack of specific regulations in the area covered by the
general statute really subvert the tribe's independent ability to govern such
matters? It would appear much more consistent with Montana for a court to
find that a tribe retains the independent authority to regulate consensual
commercial dealings absent clear congressional intent to the contrary.
Moreover, the court presumes that an absence of regulations is not a policy
decision when, in fact, such lack of regulation often is a conscious choice made
by a tribe to decrease overhead costs and promote business profitability and
economic growth. This represents a fundamental interest the tribe has in
61. Id. at 433-34.
62. 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981) (citations omitted).
63. Matheson, 563 F.3d at 436.
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regulating economic activity, as it would provide jobs and increase the standard
of living for tribal members.
This argument is further supported by a relatively recent case where the
Supreme Court upheld the Jicarilla Apache Tribe's right to impose a severance
tax on non-Indians who produced oil and gas from within the tribe's
reservation." Matheson actually cites this case in support of its supposition that
pursuant to Montana Indian tribes retain only the ability to regulate their
economic infrastructure by asserting their authority over the specific issue
covered by a statute, such as by asserting the right to tax in Merrion." This is
yet another selective reading by the Ninth Circuit. Merrion specifically
provides that the power to tax "derives from the tribe's general authority, as
sovereign, to control economic activity within its jurisdiction." Furthermore,
the Supreme Court in Merrion recognized that Indian tribes retain the right "of
self-government and jurisdiction over the persons and property within the limits
of the territory they occupy" so long as that jurisdiction has not been limited or
removed by treaty or act of Congress.67 This case makes clear that tribes have
the authority to regulate economic activity on their land. Tribes should not be
deprived of this right absent the clear intention of Congress to do so.
Second, the court deceptively notes the lack of evidence that the smoke
shop's employees entered into any agreements or dealings with the Puyallup
Tribe that would subject them to tribal civil jurisdiction. Montana clearly
expresses, however, that all that is required to subject a non-Indian to tribal civil
jurisdiction is a consensual contractual relationship with the tribe or its
members.6 1 When a non-Indian enters into a consensual employment contract
to work for an employer, he should be subject to the tribe's employment
regulations or, as in this case, the lack thereof. Here, the employees of the
Mathesons' smoke shop most likely entered into employment contracts with the
smoke shop, and this by itself should be enough to subject them to the Puyallup
Tribe's civil jurisdiction.
If the court finds it must assume that the statute presumptively applies, then
according to the Ninth Circuit the intramural, treaty, and expression-of-
intention exceptions outlined by the Ninth Circuit in Coeur d'Alene can be
64. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137-44.
65. Matheson, 563 F.3d at 433-34.
66. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137.
67. Id. at 140 (quoting S. REP. No. 45-698, at 1-2 (1879)).
68. Matheson, 563 F.3d at 436.
69. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981).
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invoked, if applicable, to rebut the presumption that the statute applies.70 In
Matheson, the court lists conditions of tribal membership, inheritance rules, and
domestic relations as examples of things it considers as purely intramural."
Given the language in Montana,72 the intramural exception should not be
interpreted so narrowly, but instead should be given a much broader reading.
For example, in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Fond du Lac
Heavy Equipment & Construction Co. the Eighth Circuit found that "[tihe
consideration of a tribe member's age by a tribal employer should be allowed to
be restricted (or not restricted) by the tribe" and that to allow this consideration
to be controlled by the federal government "dilutes the sovereignty of the
tribe."" To fully understand whether the exceptions created by the Ninth Circuit
should have ever been created (and, if so, with what principles they should be
read in conjunction), it is important first to understand the perpetual
misapplication of precedent that led it to create these exceptions in the first
place.
D. The "Exceptions"
The exceptions laid out in Coeur d'Alene have taken hold across the country
and have gained the allegiance of many circuit courts.74 The exceptions did not,
however, originate with Coeur d'Alene. United States v. Farris, a criminal
case also out of the Ninth Circuit, found that the presumption applied but failed
to cite Tuscarora or any other authority for this proposition." This is
important because the court in Coeur d'Alene relied only on Farris for its three
exceptions," and Matheson in turn relies on Coeur d'Alene." The court in
Farris explained that there seemed to be three exceptions to the rule that
statutes of general applicability are presumed to apply to Indian tribes.7s
70. Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985).
71. Matheson, 563 F.3d at 430 (quoting Coeur d'Alene, 751 F.2d at 1116).
72. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66.
73. 986 F.2d 246, 249 (8th Cir. 1993).
74. See Snyder v. Navajo Nation, 382 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2004); Equal Employment
Opportunity Comm'n v. Karuk Tribe Hous. Auth., 260 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2001); Reich v.
Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 1996).
75. 624 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1980), superseded by statute on other grounds, Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2497, as recognized in United States
v. E.C. Invs., Inc., 77 F.3d 327, 330 (9th Cir. 1996).
76. Coeur d'Alene, 751 F.2d at 1116.
77. Solis v. Matheson, 563 F.3d 425, 430 (9th Cir. 2009).
78. Farris, 624 F.2d at 893.
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For its first proposition, the court in Farris cites Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez," where the Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit's application
of the Indian Civil Rights Act, thus disallowing actions against the tribe or
tribal officers.so The Supreme Court, in finding the Act did not impliedly
authorize actions for declaratory or injunctive relief, held that Congress must
make its intention clear in order to permit such an intrusion on tribal
sovereignty.8 1 Farris attempts to argue that, because the Court in Martinez
acknowledged that Indian tribes "have power to make their own substantive law
in internal matters,"82 this results in limiting an Indian tribe's ability to self-
govern to matters that are purely intramural.83 In other words, Farris tries to
use language that the Supreme Court cites in favor of tribal independence and
the protection of tribal sovereignty to create a limitation on those very
principles. In no way does the language imply or even hint that intramural
matters are an exception to an unstated general rule.
Interestingly enough, Coeur d'Alene dealt with a statute that impinges on
tribal sovereignty without expressing unambiguous congressional intent.' The
court in that case exposed the Coeur d'Alene Tribe to suit under the
Occupational Safety and Health Act." This makes it appear strangely similar
to Martinez, the case cited for the creation of the "intramural exception.""
Martinez, however, did not find that statutes of general applicability were
presumed to include Indians, but rather the opposite: that an unequivocal
expression of congressional intent was required." The Court, unlike the court
in Farris, Coeur d'Alene, or Matheson, based its finding on a much more adept
view of Indian rights and tribal sovereignty. This is not to say that tribal
sovereignty should be the limit to the exception or that there should be an
exception at all-it is merely to show the lack of thorough analysis that created
the exceptions in the first place. Farris and its progeny fail to understand the
overall federal policy of promoting self-governance and self-sufficiency and the
connection between tribal governmental services, the revenue generated by
tribal enterprises, and tribal autonomy.
79. Id.
80. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 55-56.
83. Farris, 624 F.2d at 893.
84. Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1985).
85. Id. at 1114.
86. See Farris, 624 F.2d at 893.
87. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 59.
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How the second and third exceptions were formulated, however, is much
more understandable. The second exception-that absent the clear expression
ofCongress's intent general statutes do not abrogate rights guaranteed by Indian
treaties"-should come from the established canons of statutory construction.
It is also consistent with the idea that treaties and statutes are to be resolved in
the Indians' favor." The Court uses this canon in finding that "[t]he ratifying
legislation must be construed to exempt the Indians' preserved rights."" Of
course, a treaty ratified by Congress is not the same thing as a congressional
statute, though in many instances it may have a similar effect or may be
governed by the same principles of interpretation. So it makes perfect sense that
the Supreme Court, in concluding that a congressional act did not abrogate a
tribal member's hunting and fishing rights, would affirm that "'the intention to
abrogate or modify a treaty is not to be lightly imputed to the Congress"' while
not mentioning that Indians are afforded the same protections when a
congressional act attempts to erode tribal independence." The principle that
treaty rights should not be abrogated absent clear congressional intent is
therefore reasonable, but the Ninth Circuit's attempt to limit that principle by
making it an exception is not.
One case cited by the court in Farris seems to assert that a treaty must
overturn the general presumption that the statute applies, but the two more
recent Supreme Court cases cited by the court come nowhere near to saying that
in the absence of the rights guaranteed in a treaty a generally applicable statute
would apply. 93 To the contrary, they are surrounded by language that supports
tribal sovereignty and independence. More importantly, the oldest case,
Superintendent ofFive Civilized Tribes ex rel. Fox v. Commissioner, held that
income derived from outside the reservation was included under the taxing act's
general terms because no treaty or other act of Congress held otherwise.
While the Court in no way looked at the Act in the light most favorable to the
tribal member (as it should have done), it is still understandable that it would
find that tribal members earning income outside the reservation would not be
entitled to a presumption that the statute did not apply. The point of the
88. Farris, 624 F.2d at 893.
89. See Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 199 (1975).
90. Id. at 206.
91. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968) (quoting Pigeon River
Improvement Slide & Boom Co. v. Charles W. Cox, Ltd., 291 U.S. 138, 160 (1934)).
92. Superintendent of Five Civilized Tribes ex rel. Fox v. Comm'r, 295 U.S. 418,420-21
(1935).
93. Antoine, 420 U.S. 194; Menominee Tribe, 391 U.S. 404.
94. 295 U.S. at 421.
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presumption is that, as once-distinct sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution,
tribes are entitled to rights on their reservations that they would have enjoyed
prior to colonization absent a clear expression of Congress to limit or remove
those rights." It is completely reasonable that a court would find that earning
tax-free income is outside of the scope of those sovereign rights. This analysis
is much more consistent with the two most recent cases cited by the court in
Farris" and is also more aligned with the Supreme Court's holding in
Merrion.97
As explained in Merrion, a tribe's authority to control economic activity
within its jurisdiction is not simply derived from a treaty right to exclude non-
members from its land, but rather comes from its inherent power to self-
govern." Even the dissent in Merrion agreed that "[s]ince a tribe may exclude
nonmembers entirely from tribal territory, the tribe necessarily may impose
conditions on a right of entry granted to a nonmember to do business on the
reservation.""9 These cases support the proposition that statutes should be
construed to require congressional intent before treaty rights may be revoked,
not that in the absence of a treaty such protection is not still in place.'"
The third exception is almost self-explanatory. If Congress expresses an
intention not to apply a statute to Indian tribes, then it is self-evident that there
should not be a presumption that the statute applies. Logically, Congress,
having the authority specifically to apply statutes to tribes, also has the power
to specify that the statute does not apply to tribes and, as long as there were no
constitutional problems, courts would be bound to uphold that intent. The
second or third exceptions, however, could be invoked regardless of whether a
court believes there should be a presumption that the statute applies to tribes.
Given the language in Tuscarora it is conceivable that the court in Farris would
think it prudent to view Supreme Court cases defending a tribe's rights granted
under a treaty or upholding a tribe's rights to govern intramural matters as
carving out "exceptions." In spite of this, given the more recent Supreme Court
cases and the longstanding rights and protections the courts have afforded Indian
tribes, these decisions should be viewed not as creating exceptions but as
safeguarding specific rights preserved by the courts for Indian tribes to the
inclusion of other rights they have retained as once-sovereign nations.
95. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56-57 (1978).
96. Antoine, 420 U.S. 194; Menominee Tribe, 391 U.S. 404.
97. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137-46 (1978).
98. Id. at 137-41.
99. Id. at 160 (Stevens, J., dissenting).




E. Application of the Exceptions
The Mathesons did not argue the applicability of the third exception, that
Congress explicitly or implicitly intended the law not to apply to Indians. o' If
Congress had indicated its intention to apply or not to apply the statute, the case
more than likely would not have arisen. Faced with the Ninth Circuit's
presumption that statutes of general applicability apply to Indian tribes, the
Mathesons did, however, argue both the intramural exception and the treaty-
rights exception.102
The court's application of "the exceptions" in Matheson is a great example
of the slippery slope that has been created and has now all but wiped out any
value that the intramural exception once had. The court even went so far as to
say that the intramural exception may be used "only in those rare
circumstances where the immediate ramifications of the conduct are felt
primarily within the reservation."'o3 The court, in holding that there was
nothing "profoundly intramural" about a tribe's ability to regulate or not to
regulate employment standards for a business owned by its members and
located on its reservation, pointed to the fact that the business employs non-
Indians, sells goods to non-Indians, and is owned by tribal members rather than
by the tribe itself." The intramural exception should not be so narrowly
construed. As Merrion explained in describing a tribe's ability to tax, the right
"derives from the tribe's general authority, as sovereign, to control economic
activity within its jurisdiction."'o Though the statement does not appear to
have been intended as an exception, if the exceptions are validated by the
Supreme Court it is much more sensible to make them broad enough to include
economic and other activities located on tribal lands that are important to self-
governance.
Arguing the applicability of the treaty-rights exception, the Mathesons
asserted that their tribe's treaty right to occupy and exclude entitles them to
regulate employment and wages of non-tribal members who enter into
consensual employment agreements to work for tribal members and, in this
case, on tribal lands. 06 The court in Matheson quotes from Montana, stating
101. Solis v. Matheson, 563 F.3d 425, 429 (9th Cir. 2009).
102. Id. at 430.
103. Id. (quoting Snyder v. Navajo Nation, 382 F.3d 892, 895 (9th Cir. 2004)) (emphasis
added).
104. Id. at 434.
105. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137.
106. Matheson, 563 F.3d at 435.
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that "Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of
civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations."'o7 Montana did not say
that the tribe must exercise its right in order to retain it.I Nevertheless, the
court in Matheson focuses on the fact that, besides issuing a license to conduct
business, the Puyallup Tribe did not specifically seek to regulate wages and
hours of employment.'" In concentrating on this, the court misconstrues the
Supreme Court's holdings both in Montana and Merrion and, in the process,
severely limits the applicability of the treaty-rights exception. The court in
Matheson limits Montana to cases where the tribe asserted regulatory authority
over the activities of nonmembers."o It also cites only the beginning of the
Merrion holding, that "[a] hallmark of Indian sovereignty is the power to
exclude non-Indians from Indian lands.""'
What the court in Matheson fails to understand is that the inherent sovereign
power Indian tribes retain over non-members mentioned in Montana is
explained by the rest of the holding in Merrion. Reading further into the heart
of the Merrion holding reveals that the Supreme Court found a tribe's authority
is not simply derived from its treaty right to exclude non-members, but rather
comes from its inherent power to self-govern." 2 More specifically, the Court
in Merrion, in quoting from a treatise on Indian law, explained, "[O]ver all the
lands of the reservation, whether owned by the tribe, by members thereof, or by
outsiders, the tribe has the sovereign power of determining the conditions upon
which persons shall be permitted to enter its domain, to reside therein, and to do
business."" 3 From this statement it would be logical to conclude that a tribe
is not required specifically to assert regulatory authority over employment and
wages for non-Indians, but rather, these rights are derived from the tribe's
general authority as a sovereign. The court in Matheson should have
considered the Puyallup Tribe's authority to control economic authority, which
it derives not only from its treaty right to exclude, but also from its inherent
power to self-govern within its jurisdiction.
107. Id. (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981)).
108. Montana, 450 U.S. 544.
109. Matheson, 563 F.3d at 436.
110. Id at 436.
111. Id. at 435 (quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 141 (1982)).
112. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137-44.
113. Id at 146 n.12 (quoting COHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 439 (1942)).
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NOTE
F. What Legal Reasoning Should the Court Have Used?
Merrion stands as a compelling example of sound legal reasoning that
furthers tribal independence by taking into account the traditional notions of
tribal sovereignty." 4 Though it places emphasis on the importance of a tribe's
ability to tax, its underlying objective of supporting tribal independence gives
circuit courts good reason to question the continuing validity of Tuscarora."s
Its recognition of the broad authority Indian tribes retain to regulate economic
activity within their territories reveals, at minimum, that the exceptions truly are
far too narrow. In reality the rule should be an inverse of the first and third
exceptions: absent congressional intent to the contrary, general acts of Congress
should be presumed not to apply to Indian tribes unless the subject matter the
statute regulates is so far outside traditional notions of tribal sovereignty that it
should be held as a right not retained by the tribe. The canons of statutory
construction and the tribe's treaty right to exclude non-members support this
analysis, but, more importantly, this standard allows Indian tribes to retain
sovereign authority over matters necessary for their self-governance. In
applying this rule to the Matheson case, the ability to regulate or not to regulate
commercial activity, labor, employment, and other areas central to economic
activity on its reservation is a right that the Puyallup Tribe would as an
independent sovereign have expected to retain and, as such, it should enjoy the
presumption that statutes of Congress do not take that right absent a clear
intention to do so.
IV Conclusion
Solis v. Matheson serves as an excellent example of how, when a court
presumes the applicability of an ambiguous statute (citing Tuscarora) and then
uses the exceptions set out in Coeur d'Alene, Indian tribes stand little chance.
Given that this case involves a direct analysis of the language from Tuscarora
as well as the validity of Coeur d'Alene, it would be an excellent case for the
Supreme Court to accept on certiorari so that it can clarify its dicta in
Tuscarora and settle what is required of Congress before a federal statute may
abrogate tribal sovereignty.
The majority view is quickly trending toward a presumption that statutes of
general applicability apply to Indian tribes. It is likely that the next step
downward will be that statutes of general applicability will preempt legislation
114. See id. at 137-46.
115. See Donovan v. Navajo Forest Prods. Indus., 692 F.2d 709, 713 (10th Cir. 1982).
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already enacted by tribes. That is why it is very important for the independence
and self-governance of Indian tribes that this trend be stopped and, if possible,
reversed. The Supreme Court should step in and adopt a standard, such as the
one suggested above, that promotes tribal independence by recognizing that, on
matters involving a tribe's general authority as a sovereign, Congress must
unequivocally express its intention to include Indian tribes.
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